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THE DUE PROCESS REVOLUTION
AND CONFRONTATION *
ERWIN N. GRISWOLD t
Our law has changed a good deal in recent decades. I am not
thinking of the many statutes passed in those years. Nor am I refer-
ring to the hundreds of Supreme Court decisions handed down in the
past quarter century. I am referring to the Constitution. This may
appear strange in view of the fact that there have been only four
amendments to the Constitution in the past thirty-seven years, and
those deal with rather specific matters such as the term and disability
of the President, electors for the District of Columbia, and abolition
of the poll tax. Yet it can be said, I think, that there has been a
constitutional revolution in the past twenty years-or at least that we
are in the midst of a constitutional revolution. It can also be said,
I think, that the results have often been good-depending, of course,
on one's standards of goodness in such matters. It is hard to articulate
the intellectual bases for this revolution. Like the Court's power to
declare acts of Congress unconstitutional, it may rest, in the last
analysis, largely on fiat.' From this it may follow that the revolution
* This Article is based on the Owen J. Roberts Memorial Lecture, delivered
February 4, 1971, under the auspices of the Pennsylvania Chapter of the Order of
the Coif, the Law Alumni Society, and the University of Pennsylvania Law School.
In preparing this Article, I have drawn freely on two briefs filed by the United
States as amicus curiae in California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149 (1970). I acknowledge
the work of associates in the Department of Justice in the preparation of these briefs,
notably Beatrice Rosenberg and Roger A. Pauley of the Criminal Division, Appellate
Section, and Jerome M. Feit and Peter L. Strauss of the Solicitor General's Office.
Needless to say, the responsibility for this Article is wholly mine, and nothing in it
represents the official view of the United States or the Department of Justice.
t Solicitor General of the United States. A.B., A.M. 1925, Oberlin College;
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will always be in process, subject to qualification and reevaluation in
changing times and circumstances. The heart of the revolution is
found in the fourteenth amendment, a rather general provision whose
historical origin is well known. It prevents, in terms, the states from
depriving any person of life, liberty, or property without due process
of law, or from denying to any person the equal protection of the
laws.
The "due process" provision of the fourteenth amendment has
been used, in one way or another, to make applicable to the states
many or most-but not yet all-of the much more specific provisions
of the Bill of Rights, which are applicable of their own force only
to the federal government. One by one the specific guarantees of the
Bill of Rights have been held applicable to the states-freedom of the
press and of religion found in the first amendment, protection against
unreasonable searches and seizures guaranteed by the fourth amend-
ment, the right to jury trial, the right to counsel in criminal cases,
and the privilege against self-incrimination provided by the sixth
amendment, and the prohibition against cruel and unusual punishments
contained in the eighth amendment, among others.
I do not propose to reexamine all of these conclusions or to try
to elucidate how they came about. Rather, I am going to focus on
a very specific instance of the revolution, trace its development, and
show some of the problems which have arisen while the Court was
proceeding down this road. At the end of my discussion, there may
be room for some general observations about the process of consti-
tutional interpretation.
The instance I refer to involves the confrontation clause of the
sixth amendment which provides:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the
right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses against
him ....
This right is said to find its historical origin in the trial of Sir
Walter Raleigh.2 It brings to mind pictures of trial by affidavit,
condemnation by faceless witnesses, and proof of guilt by mere recital
of charges. There can be little doubt that extreme instances of con-
viction without confrontation would be within any fair concept of the
denial of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, which
is forbidden to the states by the fourteenth amendment. Until a few
1 As Justice Jackson said in Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 540 (1953): "We are
not final because we are infallible, but we are infallible only because we are final."
See also Henkin, Book Review, 70 CoLum. L. R.v. 1494, 1500 (1970).
2 See F. HELLER, THE SIXTH AMENDMENT 104 (1951); 1 J. STEPHEN, A HISTORY
OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND 333-36 (1883).
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years ago, however, the sixth amendment itself was specifically held
inapplicable to the states.3 Not until April, 1965, did the Court hold
in Pointer v. Texas 4 that
the Sixth Amendment's right of an accused to confront the
witnesses against him is . . . a fundamental right and is made
obligatory on the States by the Fourteenth Amendment.'
Since that time there have been a number of decisions exploring the
right to confrontation, and a number of problems have been disclosed.
To deal with those decisions and problems, some background is neces-
sary, chiefly in the application of the sixth amendment to the federal
government, as was contemplated when it was adopted.
I. EARLY INTERPRETATIONS OF THE CONFRONTATION CLAUSE
If the confrontation provision were read literally, it would allow
testimonial evidence to be presented only through witnesses present
in court. This would exclude all hearsay evidence. But it was long
ago held that this was not the intended effect of the confrontation
clause. For light on this matter we are greatly indebted to one
Clyde Mattox, who, in 1889, was charged with murdering John
Mullen in the Indian Territory. At Mattox's trial, the attending
physician testified that he had advised Mullen that he could not survive.
The physician had asked Mullen who had shot him, and Mullen re-
sponded he did not know." Defense counsel then endeavored to elicit
from the witness whether Mullen also had responded that Mattox was
not involved. The physician was not allowed to answer, on the ground
that the statement was hearsay and thus inadmissible.
Mattox was convicted but the Supreme Court reversed the judg-
ment on several grounds, one of which was that the dying declaration
should have been received in evidence.7 The Court made no reference
to the confrontation clause, because, I suppose, the evidence offered in
this case was not against the accused.
Following this decision, Mattox was retried on the murder charge.
At the second trial, it developed that two principal witnesses for the
government at the first trial had died. Both had testified at the first
3See Stein v. New York, 346 U.S. 156, 195-96 (1953); West v. Louisiana,
194 U.S. 258, 264 (1904). See also Baker v. Utecht, 161 F.2d 304 (8th Cir.), cert.
denied, 332 U.S. 831 (1947); Kelley v. People, 120 Colo. 1, 206 P.2d 337, cert.
denied, 338 U.S. 880 (1949).
4380 U.S. 400 (1965).
GId. at 403.
6 Mattox v. United States, 146 U.S. 140, 141-42 (1892).
7Id. at 152.
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trial and had been subjected to cross-examination. At the second
trial, the reporter's notes of their previous testimony were admitted
in evidence, and "constituted the strongest proof against the accused." 8
Mattox was again convicted. This time the Supreme Court affirmed
his conviction with full consideration of the confrontation clause:
The primary object of the constitutional provision in
question was to prevent depositions or ex parte affidavits, such
as were sometimes admitted in civil cases, being used against
the prisoner in lieu of a personal examination and cross-
examination of the witness in which the accused has an oppor-
tunity, not only of testing the recollection and sifting the
conscience of the witness, but of compelling him to stand face
to face with the jury in order that they may look at him,
and judge by his demeanor upon the stand and the manner
in which he gives his testimony whether he is worthy of
belief. There is doubtless reason for saying that the accused
should never lose the benefit of any of these safeguards even
by the death of the witness; and that, if notes of his testimony
are permitted to be read, he is deprived of the advantage of
that personal presence of the witness before the jury which
the law has designed for his protection. But general rules
of law of this kind, however beneficent in their operation
and valuable to the accused, must occasionally give way to
considerations of public policy and the necessities of the case.
To say that a criminal, after having once been convicted by
the testimony of a certain witness, should go scot free simply
because death has closed the mouth of that witness, would
be carrying his constitutional protection to an unwarrantable
extent. The law in its wisdom declares that the rights of the
public shall not be wholly sacrificed in order that an incidental
benefit may be preserved to the accused.'
Thus it became apparent that the confrontation clause could not be
read literally. Rather, it was to be interpreted in light of the law
as it existed at the time of the adoption of the sixth amendment,
and that law recognized exceptions to the hearsay rule. The confron-
tation clause had a purpose, clearly, but it was not designed to freeze
the law of evidence or to exclude all hearsay evidence.
The Court again considered the confrontation clause in Salinger
v. United States."0 Salinger was an appeal from a conviction for
using the mails to defraud. At trial, certain letters, bank-deposit slips,
and book entries were admitted as evidence against the accused. In
each instance, the state produced other evidence of the accused's con-
8 Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 240 (1895).
9 Id. at 242-43.
'272 U.S. 542 (1926).
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duct which brought him into such relation to the items offered "as
to make them admissible in connection with that evidence." " The
Court held the letters, bank-deposit slips, and book entries admissible.
In so doing, it reaffirmed that the confrontation clause was not meant
to rework the rules of evidence. Rather, its purpose was to "continue
and preserve [the] right [of confrontation], and not to broaden it or
disturb the exceptions." 2
II. MODERN DEVELOPMENTS: INCORPORATION; FusIoN OF
CONFRONTATION AND CROSS-EXAMINATION
With these cases as background, we now come to more modern de-
velopments." I have already referred to the decision in Pointer v.
Texas. That case involved a prosecution in a Texas state court. After
petitioner's arrest on a robbery charge, he was brought before a state
judge for a preliminary hearing at which the complaining witness testi-
fied. The petitioner had no counsel at the hearing, and, although he
was entitled to cross-examine the complaining witness, he did not do so.
Thereafter, the petitioner was indicted and brought to trial. Before
trial, however, the complaining witness moved to California. The state
introduced evidence to show that the witness had moved and did not
intend to return to Texas. The state then offered the transcript of
the witness' testimony at the preliminary hearing as affirmative evi-
dence against the petitioner. Petitioner now had counsel who objected
to the introduction of the transcript on the ground that it was a
denial of the right to confrontation. This objection was overruled,
and the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed petitioner's con-
viction.
The Supreme Court granted certiorari and held that the sixth
amendment right to confrontation is "a fundamental right and is
made obligatory on the States by the Fourteenth Amendment." '"
There is much to be said for the result. My concern here is with
the reason, for the Court analogized the right of confrontation to
the right of cross-examination:
It cannot seriously be doubted at this late date that the
right of cross-examination is included in the right of an
11 Id. at 547.
12d at 548.
13 For other discussions of the problem, see Note, Preserving the Right to Con-
frontatio--A New Approach to Hearsay Evidence in Criminal Trials 113 U PA
L. REv. 741 (1965); Comment, Confrontation and the Hearsay Rule, 75 YALE LJ.
1434 (1966). See also 5 J. WiGMoRE, EviDENCE § 1397 (3d ed. 1940); Weinstein,
Probative Force of Hearsay, 46 IOWA L. REv. 331 (1961); Developments it the
Law-Federal Habeas Corpus, 83 HARv. L. REv. 1038 (1970).
14380 U.S. at 403.
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accused in a criminal case to confront the witnesses against
him.' 5
Noting that its decisions had constantly emphasized the necessity of
cross-examination as a protection for defendants in criminal cases,
the Court continued:
There are few subjects, perhaps, upon which this Court and
other courts have been more nearly unanimous than in their
expressions of belief that the right of confrontation and cross-
examination is an essential and fundamental requirement for
the kind of fair trial which is this country's constitutional
goal. Indeed, we have expressly declared that to deprive an
accused of the right to cross-examine the witnesses against
him is a denial of the Fourteenth Amendment's guarantee of
due process of law.' 6
Later in the opinion, the Court again spoke of confrontation and
cross-examination together when it said "the Sixth Amendment's
guarantee of confrontation and cross-examination was unquestionably
denied petitioner in this case," 7 and added that "a major reason
underlying the constitutional confrontation rule is to give a defendant
charged with crime an opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses
against him." "s The Court recognized the Mattox cases but stated:
"Nothing we hold here is to the contrary." "9 Finally, the Court
recognized that:
The case before us would be quite a different one had
Phillips' statement been taken at a full-fledged hearing at
which petitioner had been represented by counsel who had
been given a complete and adequate opportunity to cross-
examine.20
Justices Harlan and Stewart concurred in the result, on the ground
that it was required by the fourteenth amendment in the circumstances
of the case.
On the same day, the Court decided Douglas v. Alabama.21 Peti-
tioner and an alleged accomplice (Loyd) were tried separately in an
Alabama state court for assault with intent to murder. The state
called the accomplice as a witness at petitioner's trial, but he repeatedly
refused to testify on the ground of self-incrimination. The prosecutor,
15 Id. at 404.
16 Id. at 405.
37Id. at 406.
3 Id. at 406-07.
19 Id. at 407.
20d.
21380 U.S. 415 (1965).
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over the petitioner's objection and despite the accomplice's refusal to
answer, read in the presence of the jury a purported confession by
the accomplice implicating the petitioner. This was done on the
asserted basis of refreshing the witness' recollection. Three law en-
forcement officers then identified the document as the confession signed
by the accomplice, but the document itself was not offered in evidence.
The petitioner was found guilty and the state appellate court affirmed
his conviction.
The Supreme Court reversed in an opinion written by Justice
Brennan. He began his discussion of the law by saying:
Our cases construing the clause hold that a primary interest
secured by it is the right of cross-examination; an adequate
opportunity for cross-examination may satisfy the clause even
in the absence of physical confrontation."
On the latter point he cited the second Mattox decision. Justice
Brennan concluded that under the circumstances Douglas' inability
to cross-examine Loyd as to the alleged confession denied him the
right of cross-examination secured by the confrontation clause.' The
mere fact that there was opportunity to cross-examine the police officers
was not "adequate to redress this denial of [an] essential right," 24
because they could testify only to the fact that Loyd made the con-
fession. Cross-examination of the police on the question of the
genuineness of the confession "could not substitute for cross-examina-
tion of Loyd to test the truth of the statement itself." ' Again, Justices
Harlan and Stewart concurred in the result.
In these two cases, the Court drew a strong parallel between the
right guarded by the confrontation clause and the right of cross-
examination-the latter of which is not expressly protected by any
constitutional provision. The Court recognized an exception to this
parallel in the case of prior testimony when there had been a full
opportunity to cross-examine (the second Matto% case) and there
was a somewhat begrudging recognition of the admissibility of dying
declarations (the first Mattox case).
If confrontation means cross-examination, however, all testimonial
evidence must be produced through live witnesses who are subject to
cross-examination as to the truth of their testimony. This would mean
either that the hearsay rule is absolute, or that certain limited excep-
tions, hallowed by time, are frozen into the Constitution and are not
22d. at 418.
2 3 Id. at 419.
24 Id. at 420.
25Id.
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subject to change, development, or experimentation by either the states
or the federal government. For some years academic writers in the
field of evidence have considered the hearsay rule an obstacle to the
development of truth. These writers suggest we expand the exceptions
to the hearsay rule and allow the trier of fact to weigh all relevant
evidence. 6 The fact that certain evidence was hearsay would, of
course, be taken into account in evaluating the evidence, but would
not render it inadmissible. If cross-examination and confrontation
are equivalent, though, any such development would be impossible-
short of a constitutional amendment-not only in federal courts, but
also, since the Pointer decision, in state courts. Thus, one consequence
of Pointer might be to freeze the hearsay rule into the Constitution,
setting up a fixed national standard on this question, and making
impossible any development or experimentation by the states in this
area.
Three years after Pointer, the Supreme Court decided Barber v.
Page.' Barber and one Woods were jointly charged with armed
robbery. At a preliminary hearing, Woods waived his privilege
against self-incrimination and testified, incriminating Barber. Barber's
counsel did not cross-examine Woods. Seven months later, when
Barber was brought to trial in Oklahoma, Woods was in a federal
prison in Texas. The state made no effort to secure Woods' presence
at the trial, but introduced the transcript of his testimony at the pre-
liminary hearing. Notwithstanding his objection that this deprived
him of his right of confrontation, Barber was convicted, and his con-
viction was affirmed by the highest state court in 1963.
Some years later, Barber sought, but was denied, federal habeas
corpus relief. The Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed
these decisions in an opinion written by Justice Marshall. Referring
to, but holding inapplicable, the second Mattox decision, he noted that
Oklahoma had made no effort to obtain Woods' presence at the trial
and that it was insufficient merely to show his absence from the juris-
2 6
See V. J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1427 (3d ed. 1940); PROPOSE] RULES OF
EVIDENCE FOR THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTS AND MAGISTRATES rule 8-03
(Preliminary Draft) (Advisory Committee's Note), in 46 F.R.D. 161, 351 (1969).
For support of a narrower extension of admissibility, to prior statements of persons
presently available for cross-examination, see UIFORm RULES OF EVIDENCE rule
63(1) (1953); MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE rule 503(b) (1942) ; Falknor, The Hearsay
Rule and Its Exceptions, 2 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 43, 48-55 (1954); McCormick, The
Turncoat Witness: Previous Statements as Substantive Evidence, 25 TEXAS L. REv.
573 (1947) ; Morgan, Hearsay Dangers and the Application of the Hearsay Concept,
62 HARV. L. REV. 177, 195 (1948) ; Weinstein, Probative Force of Hearsay, 46 IowA
L. REV. 331, 333 (1961). See also DiCarlo v. United States, 6 F.2d 364, 368 (2d
Cir.) (L. Hand, J.), cert. denied, 268 U.S. 706 (1925) ; United States v. DeSisto,
329 F.2d 929, 933-34 (2d Cir.) (Friendly, J.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 979 (1964).
27390 U.S. 719 (1968).
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tion. Justice Marshall warned that "[t]he right of confrontation
may not be dispensed with so lightly." 2' But, he continued:
The right to confrontation is basically a trial right. It in-
cludes both the opportunity to cross-examine and the occasion
for the jury to weigh the demeanor of the witness..
While there may be some justification for holding that the
opportunity for cross-examination of a witness at a prelimi-
nary hearing satisfies the demands of the confrontation clause
where the witness is shown to be actually unavailable, this
is not, as we have pointed out, such a case.'
Justice Harlan wrote a short, separate concurrence, relying on the
due process clause.
III. STATE HEARSAY RULES AND THE RIGHT TO
CONFRONTATION
A full examination of the present problem requires mention of
two recent cases, both of which involve the California statutory pro-
vision that evidence of prior inconsistent statements may be admitted
as affirmative proof of guilt.'0  In People v. Johnson," the defendant
was charged with incest. The indictment was based on evidence given
by his wife and his daughter before the grand jury, when the de-
fendant was not present, and without any cross-examination. The
grand jury returned an indictment, and the defendant pled guilty.
Some time thereafter, however, his plea was set aside on the ground
that the defendant had not had proper counsel. At the resulting trial,
however, the wife and daughter recanted, flatly denying that criminal
acts had been committed. The prosecutor then read to the jury the
relevant portions of the transcript of the testimony given by the two
witnesses before the grand jury. The trial court, pursuant to the
California statutory provisions, had charged the jury that they should
consider this prior testimony " 'in the same light and in accordance
with the same rules which you have been given as to testimony of
witnesses who have testified here in court.' "" The defendant had
been convicted.
In the California Supreme Court, the defendant contended that
the use of these prior inconsistent statements as substantive evidence
of guilt operated to deprive him of his sixth amendment right of con-
28 Id. at 725.
291d. at 725-26.
30 CAL. Evm. CODE §§ 770, 1235 (West 1966).
3168 Cal. 2d 646, 441 P.2d 111, 68 Cal. Rptr. 599 (1968), cert. denied 393 U.S.
1051 (1969).
32 Id. at 651, 441 P.2d at 115, 68 Cal. Rptr. at 603.
1971]
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frontation. The state argued that because the two witnesses were in
court and subject to cross-examination, their testimony and demeanor
could be seen and evaluated by the jury, and therefore their prior
testimony could be impeached by the evidence they gave at trial.
The California court held that the use of the prior testimony as
affirmative evidence, when it was not subject to cross-examination at
the time it was given, denied Johnson his right of confrontation and
reversed the conviction. The Supreme Court denied the state's petition
for certiorari.
The second California case eventually came before the Supreme
Court as California v. Green33 One Porter was the principal witness
at the defendant's trial for furnishing narcotics to a minor. He testi-
fied, however, that he did not recall whether it was the defendant
who had given him the narcotics. The state then offered evidence
of two prior statements made by Porter. The first was Porter's
testimony at a preliminary hearing, under oath and subject to cross-
examination, that the defendant had been his supplier. At the trial,
Porter said that he did not remember his testimony at the preliminary
hearing, but that he had testified, and that he believed his statements
at the hearing were the truth as he then believed it. On cross-
examination, he said that he had no recollection of the events covered
by his testimony.
The second statement offered at the trial pertained to a conversa-
tion between Porter and a police officer named Wade. This was
neither under oath nor subject to cross-examination. Wade testified
that Porter had told him the defendant was the supplier of narcotics.
When Porter was recalled he admitted having talked to Wade, and
said that he might have told Wade about the defendant, that he be-
lieved he was telling the truth at that time, but that he had no recol-
lection of any of these events.
Both prior statements were admitted in evidence, pursuant to the
California statute, as part of the prosecution's affirmative proof of
guilt. They were, indeed, the only direct proof that the defendant
was the person who had supplied the narcotics.
On appeal to the California Supreme Court, the state conceded
that the Johnson decision covered the police officer's testimony, since
the prior statement was not under oath or subject to cross-examination,
but it urged that that error was harmless. The principal question at
issue in the California court was the admissibility of Porter's state-
;3399 U.S. 149 (1970). The case is discussed in Kurland, Enter the Burger
Court: The Constitutional Business of the Supreme Court, October Term 1969, 1970
SUP. CT. REv. 1 38-43, and in The Supreme Court, 1969 Term, 84 HAIv. L. REv.
30, 108-17 (1970.
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ment at the preliminary hearing, which was made under oath and
subject to cross-examination. The state court held that the use of
this evidence, too, was barred by the confrontation clause. 4
Again the California authorities sought review in the Supreme
Court of the United States, and this time certiorari was granted.
The United States, through the Solicitor General's office, filed a brief
as amicus curiae, and participated in the oral argument. It recognized
that no federal statute renders witnesses' prior inconsistent statements
admissible to prove the truth of their content, and that all federal
circuits, with one exception, 5 follow the rule that such prior state-
ments are admissible only for purposes of impeachment. It suggested,
however, that the United States had an important interest in preserving
Congress' power to modify these rules in the future. The amicus
observed that:
If the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment to the
Constitution renders the California statute in this case un-
constitutional, the ability of Congress and State legislatures
(and courts) to modify rules of evidence in criminal trials,
particularly with respect to hearsay, appears to be highly
limited. 6
Reference was made to the Proposed Rules of Evidence for the United
States District Courts and Magistrates, promulgated by the Committee
on Rules of Practice and Procedure of the Judicial Conference of the
United States. Among the Committee's recommendations was a pro-
vision making any prior inconsistent statement of a witness admissible
as affirmative evidence."' This provision is virtually identical with
the California statutory provision.
The Supreme Court, in an opinion by Justice White, held the
evidence given at the preliminary examination admissible at trial as
affirmative evidence against the defendant.33 Justice White enunciated
a rather different view of the relation between confrontation and cross-
examination than had been developed by the Court in the Pointer case:
The issue before us is . . . whether a defendant's constitu-
tional right "to be confronted with the witnesses against him"
is necessarily inconsistent with a State's decision to change its
34 People v. Green, 70 Cal. 2d 654, 665, 451 P.2d 422, 429, 75 Cal. Rptr. 782, 784
(1969).
U5 The Second Circuit is the exception. See United States v. DeSisto, 329 F.2d
929 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 979 (1964).
36Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 3, California v. Green,
399 U.S. 149 (1970).
37 PROPOSED RULES OF EVIDENCE FOR THE UNITED STATES DIsTRIcT COURTS AND
MAGISTRATES rule 8-01 (c) (2) (i) (Preliminary Draft), in 46 F.R.D. 161, 331 (1969).
The rule excludes such prior inconsistent statements from the definition of hearsay.
.8399 U.S. at 164-65.
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hearsay rules to reflect the minority view described above.
While it may readily be conceded that hearsay rules and the
Confrontation Clause are generally designed to protect similar
values, it is quite a different thing to suggest that the overlap
is complete and that the Confrontation Clause is nothing more
or less than a codification of the rules of hearsay and their
exceptions as they existed historically at common law?9
Justice White then pointed out that the witness Porter was present
at the trial, and observed that "it is this literal right to 'confront' the
witness at the time of trial that forms the core of the values furthered
by the Confrontation Clause .... ," 40 He added:
Viewed historically . . . there is good reason to conclude
that the Confrontation Clause is not violated by admitting a
declarant's out-of-court statements, as long as the declarant
is testifying as a witness and subject to full and effective
cross-examination.
The Court's reasoning was applicable to both prior statements,
the one which was made under oath and subject to cross-examination,
and the one which was not." Therefore, no easy distinction between
the two statements could be drawn based upon prior opportunity for
cross-examination:
We cannot share the California Supreme Court's view that
belated cross-examination can never serve as a constitutionally
adequate substitute for cross-examination contemporaneous
with the original statement.'
[N]either evidence nor reason convinces us that contem-
poraneous cross-examination before the ultimate trier of fact
is so much more effective than subsequent examination that
it must be made the touchstone of the Confrontation Clause.4
Since Porter's testimony at the preliminary hearing had been
subject to cross-examination, the Court held it admissible despite the
fact that in his trial testimony he said he could not remember the
previous events. The Court remanded the question of Porter's state-
ment to the police officer to the California courts, so that they might
decide "[w]hether Porter's apparent lapse of memory so affected
[the defendant's] right to cross-examine as to make a critical difference
in the application of the Confrontation Clause ..
39 Id. at 155.
40 Id. at 157.
4 Id. at 158.
4See id. at 159.
431d.
44Id. at 161 (footnote omitted).
Id. at 168.
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Justice Blackmun took no part in the decision. Chief Justice
Burger and Justice Harlan wrote concurring opinions. The Chief
Justice emphasized "the importance of allowing the States to experi-
ment and innovate, especially in the area of criminal justice." 46
Justice Harlan focused his opinion on what he referred to as "an
understandable misconception . . . of numerous decisions of this
Court, old and recent, that have indiscriminately equated 'confronta-
tion' with 'cross-examination.' "41 He concluded that "the Confronta-
tion Clause of the Sixth Amendment reaches no farther than to require
the prosecution to produce any available witness whose declarations it
seeks to use in a criminal trial." 4 He found this to be true both
under the sixth amendment and under the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment. He added:
By incorporating into the Fourteenth Amendment its
[sic] misinterpretation of the Sixth Amendment these deci-
sions have in one blow created the present dilemma, that of
bringing about a potential for a constitutional rule of hearsay
for both state and federal courts. However ill-advised would
be the constitutionalization of hearsay rules in federal courts,
the undesirability of imposing those brittle rules on the States
is manifest.49
Mr. Justice Brennan dissented, finding no distinction "between a
witness who fails to testify about an alleged offense because he is
unwilling to do so and a witness whose silence is compelled by an
inability to remember." " In neither instance, he said, "are the pur-
poses of the Confrontation Clause satisfied, because the witness cannot
be questioned at trial concerning the pertinent facts." "' Referring to
the evidence given at the preliminary hearing, which was subject to
cross-examination, Justice Brennan remarked: "Cross-examination at
the hearing pales beside that which takes place at trial." 2 In his
view, the provisions of the California Evidence Code allowing the
admission of prior inconsistent statements as affirmative evidence
should be held "in violation of the Confrontation Clause." 83
That problems in interpreting the clause continue is exemplified
by the most recent Supreme Court decision to interpret the confronta-
46Id. at 171.
471d. at 172.
4s Id. at 174.
49 Id. at 184.
50 Id. at 194.
61 Id.
52d. at 197.
53Id. at 203.
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tion clause, Dutton v. Evans."' This was a murder case, which began
in a Georgia state court. At defendant's trial, there were numerous
prosecution witnesses, some of whom gave eye witness testimony of
the crime. One witness, Shaw, testified concerning a statement made
to him by Williams, one of the alleged accomplices in the crime.
Shaw, who had been Williams' fellow prisoner, testified that when
Williams returned to prison after his arraignment on the murder
charge, Williams said that if it were not for the defendant "'we
wouldn't be in this now.' "" Defense counsel objected to Shaw's
evidence on the ground that it was hearsay. The Georgia Supreme
Court held the evidence admissible under a Georgia statute " which,
as construed by the Georgia courts, allows the admission of statements
made by a co-conspirator after the conspiracy has terminated, and
even after the co-conspirator has been arrested. In this case, the
statement was made some fifteen months after the crime.
The Supreme Court thus faced a considerable extension of an
exception to the hearsay rule, authorized by a rather venerable state
statute as construed by the state court. Williams' statement was not
given under oath, nor was it subject to cross-examination when made.
The problem presented goes beyond that in California v. Green, since
Williams could not have been expected to testify at trial, due to his
probable reliance on the privilege against self-incrimination. The jury
would therefore have been unable to view the witness and there would
be no opportunity for cross-examination.
The extreme difficulty of the case is evidenced by the lack of
agreement among the Justices. The Court decided that the admission
of the evidence did not violate the confrontation clause. Justice
Stewart announced the judgment of the Court in an opinion in which
the Chief Justice and Justices White and Blackmun concurred. Justice
Harlan filed an opinion concurring in the result. Joining in an opinion
written by Justice Marshall, four members of the Court dissented.
Thus, I think it may fairly be said that although the result was
5 to 4, the decision was about 4.6 to 4.4. Justice Harlan's difficulty
with the problem is apparent from his observation that, as a result
of his consideration of the Evans case, he was no longer "content
with the position" he took in his concurring opinion in California v.
Green, decided only six months previously.
In Dutton, Justice Stewart said: "[T]his Court has never indi-
cated that the limited contours of the hearsay exception in federal
54400 U.S. 74 (1970).
55 Id. at 77.
66 GA. CODE ANN. § 38-306 (1954).
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conspiracy trials are required by the Sixth Amendment's Confrontation
Clause." " Just how this squares with the Court's language in Pointer
v. Texas is not clear. At any rate, we have, six years after Pointer V.
Texas, a decision holding that hearsay evidence may be admissible
even though there was no cross-examination when the statement was
made, and the declarant did not appear at trial, and thus was never
subject to cross-examination. The marriage of cross-examination and
confrontation which was certified in 1965 found its way, by a very
difficult path, to at least a limited divorce in 1970. But though the
concepts are no longer merged, they surely have much in common.
Just how is the line between them to be drawn?
Certainly there are constitutional limits on the use of hearsay
evidence, even though the confrontation clause cannot be taken literally.
Suppose two men are charged with a crime, but are tried separately.
At the trial of one, evidence is offered through a third person that
the other has given a confession in which he maintains that the first
defendant committed the crime and related to him the story of the
crime in considerable detail. Surely this would not be admissible.
It is precisely the evil that the confrontation clause was designed to
prevent, and seems equally obnoxious to the due process clause. This
is, after all, essentially what was decided in Douglas v. Alabama.""
On the other hand, how is it different from Dutton v. Evans? Only
in degree, I suppose-but the distinction is not the worse for that.
The evidence involved in Dutton v. Evans was not the whole story.
It was but a small part of the picture, and it had certain earmarks of
truth in that it was spontaneous and against interest.
It is clear now that some kinds of hearsay are admissible despite
the confrontation clause: for example, dying declarations and prior
recorded testimony when the witness is dead or when he is currently
present and subject to cross-examination. In addition, book entries
are apparently admissible as exceptions to the hearsay rule, and this
may be important in such cases as prosecutions for mail fraud or for
violations of the securities laws. It also appears, from Dutton v.
Evans, that the hearsay rule is not frozen, and that certain extensions
of it may be upheld despite the confrontation clause.
Let us suppose, though, that a state, moved by a desire to make
available all relevant evidence, repeals the hearsay rule. This may
seem a little startling to us. But it should not be forgotten that
acceptance of hearsay is the norm in nearly all countries of the world,
67400 U.S. at 82. Later in his opinion Justice Stewart, referring to the con-
frontation clause and the hearsay evidence rules, said: "[T]his Court has never equated
the two, and we decline to do so now." Id. at 86.
58 See also Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968).
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except those which follow the common law system. The hearsay rule
is unknown in most parts of the world, and it mystifies many of our
legal visitors. It seems clear, though, that the application of such an
enactment to its full extent would violate the confrontation clause.
It would allow the admission into evidence of any extra-judicial state-
ment, without any possibility of cross-examination, even though the
statement was by no means slight or incidental, and even though it
had no earmark of truth.
Suppose no live witnesses testify at all. One might think that
impossible in a criminal trial, but such a case came across my desk
not long ago. United States v. Lloyd " was a criminal prosecution
under the Selective Service Act. At defendant's trial for refusal to
report for induction, "[t]he only evidence offered by the government
was a certified and authenticated copy of Lloyd's Selective Service file.
No witness testified for the government." 60 The court held that this
was sufficient to support a conviction. At first this bothered me, but
I have now been able to rationalize the court's decision. What it means,
I think, is that the introduction of this evidence is sufficient to shift the
burden of going forward. The burden of proof is on the Government,
and stays on the Government; but if the defendant wants to attack the
record he must take steps to do so. This does not mean that he must
give up his privilege against self-incrimination. He can, for example,
call the clerk of the draft board, or members of the board, and attempt
to prove that the record is not accurate. Or he can introduce other
evidence, such as copies of his own letters sent to the draft board, which
do not appear in his file, and which show that the board did not give
adequate consideration to his case or did not accord to him a right
required by the law or regulations. I do not think it shocking that, in
the absence of any sort of attack, the record is sufficient to prove what-
ever it shows. It would surely be better practice, however, to have such
a record introduced by a live witness, who can testify to the way the
records have been kept and can support their accuracy and completeness.
IV. CONFRONTATION AS A CHALLENGE TO JUDICIAL
CRAFTSMANSHIP
Before leaving Dutton v. Evans, I should refer to the distinction
it received-unusual for complicated Supreme Court decisions-of
being the subject of the opening article in the New Yorker of January
59 431 F.2d 160 (9th Cir. 1970).
60 Id. at 163.
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2, 1971. The article gives Dutton v. Evans rather sweeping importance
by saying that it
demonstrated that President Nixon has reversed the course
that the Warren Court had taken for some fifteen years-
that he has switched the five-to-four positive majority under
Chief Justice Earl Warren to a five-to-four negative majority
under Chief Justice Warren E. Burger."
The article continues with the observation that the prevailing Justices
in Dutton v. Evans are "innovative" because they did not regard the
Supreme Court's 1965 decision in Pointer v. Texas as binding in all
cases of hearsay. The author then remarks:
But the newcomers innovate with a difference, for where the
Warren Court's most controversial rulings merely stated that
defendants in criminal actions had long been denied their
ordinary Constitutional rights, the Burger Court has gone
back to the old system of tacitly approving that denial. 2
The article proceeds in this despairing vein, arguing that
[p]art of the endless struggle to establish justice has been
the attempt to establish it uniformly. Indisputably, Georgia
justice is different from Maine justice or Nebraska justice;
indisputably, it should not be.'
But is this wholly clear? Is there only one way to administer justice?
Is there one system which leads to the truth more surely than any
other? Have the evidence professors been wrong in saying that the
hearsay rule often excludes relevant and reliable evidence? Is there
anything in the Constitution which fairly prevents the use of some
hearsay evidence? Should there not be continued room for experi-
mentation in the several states in the quest for justice? Is there any
reason why procedures in all of the states should be frozen into pre-
cisely the same mold? Are we not still a federated nation, and is there
not merit in diversity? Is all wisdom and justice centralized in
Washington? 0'
This, I suggest, is the real significance of Dutton v. Evans. It is
basically a decision in the realm of constitutional method, and spe-
cifically in the area of federal-state relationships. It may fairly be
said that there is more chance of achieving justice through Dutton v.
01 NEW YoRKER, Jan. 2, 1971, at 15.
62Id. 16.
31d.
64 Cf. Friendly, The Bill of Rights as a Code of Criminal Procedure, 53 CALW.
L. REv. 929 (1965).
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Evans than through a decision which would have solidified the law
of evidence in all the states into a federal mold. Viewed in this broader
light, there is nothing in Dutton v. Evans which justifies the New
Yorker editorial writer's gloom.
Of course, we would not have encountered these problems if the
sixth amendment had not been held applicable to the states. Without
encountering too many difficulties, we got along without that applica-
tion for 174 years, until the Pointer case was decided in 1965. If
there were real problems, perhaps they could have been resolved by
a thoughtful application of the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment, which is fully applicable to the states.
But, it is said, the due process clause is vague and leaves much
to the choice of the judges; and this is unsound, and undemocratic,
and consigns us to the whim of men, who ought rather to be bound
by the specific text of the Bill of Rights. The fourteenth amendment,
however, does not expressly make the sixth amendment applicable
to the states, and to leap from the fourteenth amendment to the sixth
may be a much more sweeping application of free human choice than
the construction and application of the due process clause. Beyond
that is the fact that the seeming clearness of the language of the
sixth amendment is, alas, illusory.
Our experience with the sixth amendment has taught us that it
does not mean what it says. Despite the constitutional provision, it
is not the applicable law that the accused is entitled in all circum-
stances to confront the witnesses against him. Like all good consti-
tutional provisions, the crisp language of the confrontation clause turns
out to be somewhat cryptic. It requires thoughtful consideration and
application in the light of its historical origins and the general approach
of the common law to evidence problems. Just as "no law" in the
first amendment cannot literally mean "no law," "confront the wit-
nesses against him" cannot literally mean confrontation in all circum-
stances. Just what it does mean is filled with problems. We have
judges to resolve such questions as they are presented in particular
cases. The task of the judges must be accepted and carried out with
thought, and, in the last analysis, judgment. It cannot be done by
rote, and to think that such a task can be performed when courts are
tied down firmly to a text is, at best, an illusion.
This illustrates an aspect of the task of judging which is inescap-
able and timeless. We have this record of an interchange in the courts
of England more than six hundred years ago:
R. Thorpe (counsel) : You will do as others in the same case,
otherwise we shall not know what the law is.
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Hillary (J.): [Law is] volunte de Justices.
Stonore (J.) Nanyl; ley est resoun. 5
It is clear, and should be recognized, that law as developed by
judges consists of both aspects. To a very large extent, law is reason.
Judges act professionally. They use the materials of the law, and
they use them logically and thoughtfully, in the way sanctioned by
an external standard, which we call the law. They are not free to
go on frolics of their own, or to decide according to their free choice
or whim. But, recognizing this, it is still true that in many cases
that come before appellate courts, the law, in those professional terms,
does not provide a clear answer. At this point the judge must make
a choice, albeit usually a narrow one. And when this is done, in
constitutional law as well as elsewhere, law becomes the will of the
judges.
It is important to understand and accept the fact that there is
nothing illegitimate or evil in this process. The process of reasoning
involved in judicial decisionmaking requires careful training and high
ability. It is largely a matter of the intellect. The process of choice
involved in many judicial decisions requires character, breadth of
vision, outlook, and wisdom. It is, to a considerable extent, a matter
of the spirit. This combination of intellect and spirit in people like
Holmes, Brandeis, Hughes, Cardozo, Stone, Roberts, Hand, Frank-
furter, and Jackson has given us our greatest judges. These men
adhered to the rationality of the law. They recognized that texts and
precedents are of great significance and are often binding on the
judge. But they recognized, too, that texts and precedents are not
always as clear as they may seem.
It is here that the process of judging rises to its highest level.
It is not a matter of strict construction or of loose construction. In
dealing with the problem of the right of confrontation in state courts,
it takes a very loose construction of the fourteenth amendment to
bring the sixth amendment into the picture at all. Perhaps it is better,
then, to rest the problem directly on the fourteenth amendment, even
though its terms are general, trusting in the experienced and informed
opinion of the judges.
61See Y. B. Hilary 19 Edw. 3 (1344-45), at 379 (L. Pike ed. & transl. 1905).
